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Staible et al.: Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems

UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
THE 35TH ORDINARY SESSION of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights is scheduled to take place May 3-17,
2004 in Dakar, Senegal. A draft of the proposed schedule has not yet been released at the
time of this writing.

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
THE EUROPEAN COURT of Human Rights
(Court) was established in 1959 by the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention). Enforcing the obligations
entered into by the Council of Europe’s Contracting States, the Court is composed of the
number of judges equal to that of the Contracting States. Any Contracting State or individual claiming to be a victim of a violation of
the Convention may lodge a complaint with
the Court. In its decisions, the Court takes
into account the various legal systems of the
Contracting States.
ELÇI

AND

OTHERS V. TURKEY

In Elçi and Others v. Turkey, the Court held
that the arrest and detention of sixteen Turkish
lawyers violated their rights under Articles 3, 5
and 8 of the European Convention.
The sixteen applicants were arrested and
detained between mid-November and early
December 1993, after Turkish security forces
procured a confession from a former member
of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). The former PKK member alleged that the applicants
acted as messengers between members of the
PKK, including the applicants’ detained
clients. The applicants contended that they
were targeted for arrest because they represented clients before the State Security Court. The
applicants filed complaints with the Court in
1993 and 1994. The case was deemed admissible in 1996, and the complaints were joined in
September 1997.
In their complaint, the applicants alleged
that their detention violated the European
Convention’s protection of liberty and security
under Article 5. Some of the applicants also
argued that they were tortured in violation of
the Convention’s prohibition of torture under
Article 3. It was also asserted that, while in custody, the applicants were subjected to coercive
questioning, threatened, stripped, hosed down
with cold water, humiliated and slapped in
order to coerce them to sign confessions. They
were held in cold, damp cells and corridors and

forced to sleep on the floor, sometimes blindfolded. They were allowed access to the bathroom only twice a day and were denied adequate nourishment.
Some of the applicants further alleged that
security forces searched their homes and offices
and seized documents (including the files of
applicants to the European Commission of
Human Rights) during their arrests. Such
treatment would constitute violations of their
right to respect of privacy under Article 8.
Prohibition of Torture and Inhuman
Treatment and Punishment
The Court stressed that Article 3 protections against torture are fundamental to
democracy and are not subject to derogation,
even in circumstances involving threats of terrorism and organized crime. Despite this strict
prohibition, the Court emphasized that illtreatment must attain a minimum level of
severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum level is
based on all the circumstances of the case,
including the duration of the treatment, its
physical or mental effects and, in some cases,
the sex, age and state of health of the victim.
In evaluating the applicants’ specific claims
under Article 3, the Court noted that the allegations made by several applicants of ill-treatment that occurred at one location were credible as a whole. The Court paid particular
attention to medical examinations that corroborated the applicants’ claims of abuse. The
Court also noted that there were inconsistencies in the evidence of the Government witnesses and that the applicants’ complaints were
not taken seriously enough or adequately
investigated by the authorities. The Court held
that due to the seriousness and cruelty of the
treatment and the severity of the pain suffered
by the applicants, the actions of the security
forces constituted torture within the meaning
of Article 3. The Court also found that during
their detention, certain applicants were subjected to ill-treatment that amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, another violation of Article 3.
The Right to Liberty and Security
The Court emphasized that Article 5
requires any deprivation of liberty to be “lawful” and to comply with “a procedure prescribed by law.” This language should be
understood to strictly prohibit the arbitrary
detention of individuals. The Court also
55

recalled the “reasonable suspicion” requirement
under Article 5, which presupposes the existence of facts or information leading an objective observer to find that the person concerned
may have committed the offence in question.
“Reasonableness” is determined by the circumstances of a given case. Using this standard, the
Court held that Turkey violated the applicants’
Article 5 protections.
The Right to Privacy
With regard to Article 8, the Court highlighted that a lawyer’s freedom to carry out
his/her work without interference is both an
essential characteristic of a democratic society
and a necessary prerequisite for the effective
enforcement of the provisions of the Convention. In this case, the persecution and harassment of members of the legal profession violated the terms of the European Convention. The
Court found that the searches of five of the
applicants’ houses and, in certain cases, the
seizure of personal documents and other items
constituted an interference with the applicants'
right to respect for their homes and correspondence. The Court determined that the search of
the professional offices of two of the applicants,
and the seizure of their files, also amounted to
an interference with their right to respect for
their homes and correspondence. Because the
search and seizure measures were implemented
without proper authorization or safeguards,
they constituted a breach of Article 8.
Under Article 41, the Convention’s provision on just satisfaction, the Court awarded the
applicants sums ranging from 1,210 to 1,750€
for pecuniary damages and 2,100 to 36,000€
for non-pecuniary damages.

INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN
RIGHTS SYSTEM
THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS system was created with the adoption of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man (Declaration) in 1948. In 1959, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights
(Commission) was established as an independent organ of the Organization of the American
States (OAS) and it held its first session one
year later. In 1969, the American Convention
on Human Rights (Convention) was adopted.
The Convention further defined the role of the
Commission and created the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (Court). According to
the Convention, once the Commission determines the case is admissible and meritorious, it
will make recommendations and, in some
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cases, present the case to the Court for adjudication. The Court hears these cases, determines
responsibility under relevant regional treaties
and agreements, and assesses and awards damages and other forms of reparation to victims of
human rights violations.

STATEHOOD SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE V.
UNITED STATES, REPORT NO. 98/03
On December 29, 2003, the Commission
issued Report No. 98/03, finding the lack of
federal representation and participation for citizens of the District of Columbia (D.C.) in the
United States to be a violation of the Declaration. This decision came more than ten years
after the Statehood Solidarity Committee
(petitioners), entered a petition against the
United States Government, in April 1993, on
behalf of all D.C. citizens.
Petitioners’ Claim
Since the inception of the District of
Columbia in 1801, D.C. citizens have been
denied representation in the U.S. Senate and
allowed only one non-voting Member in the
U.S. House of Representatives. The petitioners
claimed that by denying D.C. citizens representation in the U.S. federal legislature, the
United States is in violation of Article II (right
to equality under the law) and Article XX
(right to vote and participate in government)
of the Declaration.
The petitioners claimed that the United
States fails to afford them equality under the
law, protected by Article II of the Declaration,
because unlike citizens of U.S. states, D.C. citizens are denied the right to legislative, budgetary, and full judicial autonomy. Article II
allows for differential treatment only when
there is a legitimate aim and an objective justification for such differential treatment, and a
proportional relationship between the means
employed and the aim sought.
In creating the District of Columbia and
denying it federal representation over 200
years ago, the U.S. government sought to protect the safety and integrity of the federal seat
of government. The government was concerned that D.C. citizens could potentially rise
up against the government and cause political
instability. It also feared that due to their close
proximity to the federal government, D.C. citizens would have disproportionate influence
over policymakers.
The petitioners argued that these historical
reasons for denying D.C. citizens federal representation are outdated and can no longer justify
continued differential treatment today. The
petitioners speculated that D.C.’s continued
lack of representation may stem from bias

against African-Americans, who make up the
majority of the D.C. population. They concluded that such differential treatment, whether
racially motivated or otherwise, is detrimental to
the citizens of the District of Columbia and cannot be justified in light of the antiquated rationale formulated over 200 years ago.
In addition, the petitioners claimed that by
denying D.C. citizens full congressional representation, the United States denies them
meaningful participation in the national government, in contravention to Article XX of the
Declaration. The petitioners contended that
the alternative methods of political participation offered by the State (described below),
were not sufficient to guarantee the rights provided by Article XX. Finally, the petitioners
argued that no other federal district in the
Americas denies its citizens the right to federal
representation, citing examples such as Buenos
Aires, Argentina; Brasilia, Brazil; Mexico City,
Mexico; and Caracas, Venezuela.
State Response
The United States responded to the petitioners’ Article II claim by arguing that the
differential treatment of D.C. citizens was not
based on racial discrimination nor was it an
attempt to disenfranchise its citizens. Instead,
it claimed that such differential treatment was
based on the State’s interest in protecting the
security and integrity of the federal seat of
government.
In response to the petitioners’ Article XX
claim, the United States contended that the
Declaration was not explicit as to the framework and methods of political participation
and therefore it was within the discretion of
the states to determine the structure of their
government. The United States further argued
that D.C. citizens did in fact have the opportunity to participate in political processes
through quasi-representation in Congress and
through presidential and local elections. Ultimately, the United States argued that the issue
of D.C. voting rights should be left to the
American people to debate and decide on, and
not to the international community.
Commission’s Findings
The Commission found that the United
States had violated Articles II and XX of the
Declaration by denying D.C. citizens the right
to equal and effective participation in government. The Commission found that the denial of
D.C. citizens’ right to meaningful representation, while the citizens of U.S. states were granted that same right, violated the petitioners’ right
to equality under the law as guaranteed by Article II of the Declaration. It found that such lim56

itations on D.C. citizens’ political participation
were arbitrary and without justification.
In addition, the Commission found that
the United States was violating Article XX of
the Declaration by denying D.C. citizens effective participation in the national legislature.
While the Commission recognized the autonomy of states to structure their governments as
they saw fit, it underscored the need for member states to meet the minimum standards
required to give effect to internationally recognized human rights, such as the right to participate in government.
The Commission found that the alternative political activities mentioned by the United States were insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of Article XX. Specifically, the
Commission found that the existence of a nonvoting Member of the House of Representatives was essentially meaningless and rendered
D.C.’s participation in the federal legislature
ineffective. Ultimately, the Commission found
that the restrictions imposed by the United
States curtailed the right of D.C. citizens to
participate in their national government without adequate justification.
Regarding the petitioners’ contention that
D.C.’s lack of federal representation stemmed
from a bias against African-Americans, the
Commission found that a racial discrimination
component of the Article II and XX violations
was not adequately briefed so as to make a specific determination. The Commission found
that though this lack of representation had a
prejudicial impact on the African-American
community, there was insufficient evidence to
prove discriminatory intent on the part of the
United States.
It is unlikely the United States will decide
to grant D.C. residents representation in the
national legislature based on this decision
alone. However, this decision is important in
that it conveys regional condemnation of an
undemocratic structure and raises this important issue before the international community.
While the United States is generally unresponsive to international pressure, especially in relation to its domestic affairs, this decision will
surely energize the movement for D.C. voting
rights at the national level.
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